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Christopher Larkosh 
 
 
 
On peut se montrer scandalisé par cette conception utopique et, 
pour un moi, inhumaine. L’humanité dans l’être historique et 
objectif, la percée même du subjectif, du psychisme humain, dans son 
originelle vigilance ou dégrisement, c’est l’être qui se défait de sa 
condition d’être : le dés-inter-essement. C’est ce que veut dire le titre 
du livre : « autrement qu’être ». La condition se défait, ou est défaite, 
dans la condition ou l’incondition humaine. Être humain, cela 
signifie : vivre comme si l’on n’était pas un être parmi les êtres.  
(Levinas, 1982, p. 97) 
  
Se supera la razón emancipadora como “razón liberadora” 
cuando se descubre el eurocentrismo de la razón ilustrada, cuando 
se define la “falacia desarrollista” del proceso de modernización 
hegemónico. Esto es posible, aún para la razón de la Ilustración, 
cuando éticamente se descubre la dignidad del Otro (de la otra 
cultura, del otro sexo y género, etcétera) cuando se declara inocente 
a las víctimas desde la afirmación de su Alteridad como Identidad en 
la Exterioridad como personas que han sido negadas por la 
Modernidad. De esta manera, la razón es trascendida (pero no como 
negación de la razón en cuanto tal, sino de la razón violenta 
eurocéntrica, desarrollista, hegemónica).TPF1FPT (Dussel, 2000, p. 50)  
                                                 
TP
1
PT The reason of emancipation as a “liberating reason” is overcome when the 
Eurocentrism of Enlightenment reason is discovered and the developmentalist 
fallacy in the hegemonic process of modernization is identified. This is 
possible, even for Enlightenment reason, when the dignity of the Other (of the 
other culture, the other sex and gender etc.) is discovered ethically, and when 
the victims are declared innocent, out of the affirmation of their Otherness as 
Identity in Exteriority, as people who have been negated by Modernity. In this 
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Giving importance and space to the subject of ethics in translation 
studies remains a decisive move in the often divided present-day 
environment of the discipline, not because of any lack of awareness of 
a possible relationship between ethics and professional practice, but 
because many practitioners in our field may still be unconvinced of the 
necessity of humanistic, and especially philosophical/theoretical, 
approaches. I would hope that the prominence given to a concern such 
as ethics in current discussions confirms our ongoing commitment to 
the crucial need of critical thought in asking some of the most pressing 
questions in this our ‘ever-emergent’ field of study, as the answers we 
give them translate into concrete institutional decisions related to 
pedagogical and professional practice inside and outside of the more 
obscure cerebral alcoves of academe.  
 
To name a few of these questions: How do issues of linguistic, 
gender, racial and ethnic identity give broader meaning to the 
individual acts we perform as translators and interpreters? How does 
the discussion of ethics in translation extend to instances in which 
translation assists in linguistically reproducing and institutionally 
maintaining relations of cultural, political or economic hegemony? Is it 
possible to exercise the translator’s craft in such a way as to facilitate a 
reading of ‘linguistically othered’ texts for large audiences, while 
respecting and extending the scope and potential for cultural diversity, 
and what is the ethical position of work that insists (be it tacitly) on a 
depoliticized approach as the unquestioned state of business as usual?  
 
As I have stated elsewhere in discussions of what we might 
begin to call the theoretical imperative in translation studies (Larkosh, 
2004, p. 108), such an ethical commitment should not be construed as 
either ‘anti-practice’ or ‘anti-linguistic.’ On the contrary, the 
translator’s presence as a theorizing subject, now more than ever, can 
be recognized as inseparable from this practice. Clearly, discussions of 
translational ethics must be concerned not only with the accurate 
transferral of meaning, but also the broader cultural significance and 
potential public spaces of the texts we translate and the institutionalized 
positions from which we do so. Translating ethically, especially from 
Global South to Global North, may well imply an interruption in 
official discourses by enabling voices not traditionally audible in 
present-day academic discussions of translational ethics to come forth, 
                                                                                                 
way, Reason is transcended (but not as a negation of reason per se, but of a 
violent, Eurocentric, developmentalist, hegemonic reason). (My translation)  
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and thereby challenging the Eurocentric foundations of present 
structures of symbolic domination. As I intend to show, Latin 
American thinkers have had much to contribute to this discussion of 
ethics that emanates from a critique of conventional constructions of 
identity, alterity and mechanisms of global hegemony. 
 
Viewing translation through this theoretical lens underscores 
these extratextual ethical concerns, including that which the French 
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas has called “la responsabilité pour 
autrui” (Levinas, 1978, pp. 22-25). At first glance this idea may seem 
simple enough, but this apparent simplicity conceals a complex ethical 
task that many would judge to border on the impossible:  
 
Positivement, nous dirons que dès lors qu’autrui me regarde, j’en suis 
responsable, sans même avoir à prendre de responsabilités à son 
égard; sa responsabilité m’incombe. C’est une responsabilité qui va 
au-delà de ce que je fais. D’habitude, on est responsable de ce qu’on 
fait soi-même. Je dis, dans Autrement qu’être, que la responsabilité 
est initialement un pour autrui. Cela veut dire que je suis responsable 
de sa responsabilité même. (Levinas, 1982, p. 92) 
 
I would argue that this nearly unattainable ethical standard set by 
Levinas’ discussion of ethical responsibility is ironically what also 
makes it most pertinent to the act of translation and interpretation, one 
with which we are already familiar in the study of translation and 
whose relevance recent interpretation studies scholarship has also 
begun to recognize (Furmanek, 2004).  
 
Moreover, it is no coincidence that the work of Levinas in 
which this ethical relationship is given in greatest detail, Autrement 
qu’être ou Au-delà de l’essence, is dedicated to “les êtres les plus 
proches parmi les six millions d’assassinés par les nationaux-
socialistes, à côté des millions et des millions d’humains de toutes 
confessions et de toutes nations, victimes de la même haine de l’autre 
homme, du même antisémitisme” (Levinas, 1978, p. 5). Levinas’ own 
Jewish identity is pivotal in the development of his ethical stance, one 
that emerges from his own personal experience as the survivor of a 
forced labor camp in one of human history’s greatest tragedies, the 
Nazi Holocaust (Peperzak, 1993, p. 4). So if indeed Levinas’ ethical 
stance of absolute responsibility is an impossible one, it is perhaps 
because of the absolute human ethical crisis from which it emerges. 
Impossible, but considering what is at stake, then perhaps precisely 
why it is all the more necessary, a stance also reflected in the Derridian 
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paradox of translation that has been circulating in translation studies for 
some time: “the necessary and impossible task of translation, its 
necessity as impossibility” (Derrida, 1985, p. 171).  
 
In his book Postmodern Ethics, the Polish philosopher 
Zygmunt Bauman elaborates upon Levinas’ most dramatic reversal of 
the principles of modern ethics, in which he grants the Other that 
priority which was once unquestionably assigned to the self (Bauman, 
1993, p. 85). Indeed, Levinas inverts the seventeenth-century 
philosopher Spinoza’s concept of conatus essendi, i.e., the drive to be 
and remain who or what ‘we’ are. The contemporary critique of 
Spinoza’s conatus extends beyond continental philosophy, however. A 
rereading of the Argentine short story entitled “Borges y yo” is useful 
not only to illustrate this concept, but also to allow for a discussion on 
how such an attachment to identity may not be as tenable in a 
contemporary context:  
 
Spinoza entendió que todas las cosas quieren perseverar en su ser; la 
piedra eternamente quiere ser piedra el tigre un tigre. Yo he de 
quedar en Borges, no en mí (si es que alguien soy), pero me 
reconozco menos en sus libros que en muchos otros o que en el 
laborioso rasgueo de una guitarra. Hace años yo traté de librarme de 
él y pasé de las mitologías del arrabal a los juegos con el tiempo y 
con el infinito, pero esos juegos son de Borges ahora y tendré que 
idear otras. Así que la vida es una fuga y todo lo pierdo y todo es del 
olvido, o del otro.  
No sé cuál de los dos escribe esta página.TPF2FPT (Borges, 1974, p. 186)  
  
This vision of ethics and alterity is thus interrogated in one of the most 
identifiable of Latin American literary contexts, although often with an 
extended set of ideological and cultural underpinnings. Borges’ wish to 
identify with the texts of others may result from his own history of 
reading, one which has in effect shaped his own identity to such an 
                                                 
TP
2
PT Spinoza understood that all things wish to persevere in their being: a stone 
eternally wants to be a stone, and a tiger to be a tiger. I have to remain in 
Borges, not in me (if in fact I am someone), but I recognize myself less in his 
books than in many others or in the laborious strumming of a guitar. A few 
years ago I tried to free myself from him and went from the mythologies of the 
suburbs to playing with time and the infinite, but those games belong to Borges 
now and I will have to think up other things. Thus my life is a fugue and I lose 
it all, and everything belongs to forgetting or to the other. I do not know which 
of us has written this page. (My translation) 
 
 30
extent that it often appears to upstage his own activity as an author. 
What Borges’ blurred distinction between self and other evokes, at least 
as illustrated here, is more evocative of the inherent limits of this 
otherness, as it is by extension an encounter with his own self-
constructed Western cultural canon and its (mis)interpreted others. It is 
through this developing awareness that we begin to speak of 
transcultural consciousness: one which places the recognized limits of 
one’s own identity within an expanded historical context of cultural 
exchange. Nonetheless, it remains troubling that in this example from 
an author so frequently at the center of 20PthP-century discussions on 
translation, the relationship with the other is internalized to such an 
extent that it is difficult to evaluate its potential in imagining a 
relationship with those others who cannot be appropriated into one’s 
own conception of identity. It becomes necessary, especially in the 
Latin American context, to extend such solipsistic conceptions of 
translational alterity to examine the more complex spaces of linguistic 
and cultural otherness, as it is this movement that makes a conception 
of “Otherness as Identity in Exteriority” (Dussel, 2000, p. 50) possible.  
 
In Latin America, the ethical necessity to move toward a more 
complex transcultural consciousness emerges as a response to the 
legacy of structures of colonial power. As we have already begun to 
examine here, links to Levinasian ethicsTPF3FPT are particularly evident in the 
‘liberation philosophy’ of the Argentine Enrique Dussel, who writes:  
 
Teníamos la conciencia de ser la ‘otra-cara’ de la Modernidad. En 
efecto, la Modernidad nace en realidad en 1492 con la ‘centralidad’ 
de Europa (el ‘eurocentrismo’ se origina al poder Europa envolver el 
mundo árabe que había sido el centro del orbe conocido hasta el siglo 
XV). El ‘yo,’ que se inicia como el ‘yo conquisto’ de Cortés o 
Pizarro, que anteceden prácticamente al ego cógito cartesiano por un 
siglo, produce el genocidio, la esclavitud del africano, las guerras 
                                                 
TP
3
PT The impact of Levinas upon Dussel’s work is apparent beginning with the 
epigraphs in Dussel’s 1973 work Para una ética de la liberación 
latinoamericana: the first from the 16PthP century defender of indigenous peoples 
Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, the second from Levinas’ Totalité et Infini: “La 
ética, más allá de la vision y la certeza, designa la estuctura de la exterioridad 
como tal. La moral no es una rama de la filosofía, sino la filosofía primera” 
[Ethics, beyond vision and certainty, designates the structure of Exteriority as 
such. Morals are not a branch of philosophy but rather philosophy first and 
foremost.] (My translation, in Dussel, 1973, p. 9)  
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coloniales del Asia. La mayoría de la humanidad presente (el ‘Sur’), 
es la ‘otra-cara de la Modernidad.’TPF4FPT(Dussel, 1994, p. 59) 
 
As a philosophy which claims to be “popular, feminista, de la juventud, 
de los oprimidos, de los condenados de la tierra,” etc. (“popular, 
feminist, of youth, of the oppressed, of the condemned of the earth,” 
Dussel, 1994, p. 59), Dussel’s cross-identificatory drive is clearly 
broad-based, going so far as to take up an identitarian stance firmly on 
the ‘Other’ side of humanity. Even if each of us might not find a 
reference to his/her own subject positionality in this outline of 
otherness on the threshold of our new millennium (and if one were 
simply to place an ellipsis there at the end of that always incomplete 
list, what would become of the division between these two distinct 
“faces”?), it is nonetheless clear that the goal for Dussel is no longer 
simply to explore the multiplicity of identity, but to provide, through 
philosophical observations grounded in an ethical imperative, the 
theoretical and practical means for oppressed people to convert this 
consciousness into social acts of liberation.  
 
But is this the only way to create a change between the 
Western subject and its others? What if it were to come not by 
‘choosing a face,’ but by affirming the “anyoneness” (“quodlibet ens: 
l’essere tale che comunque importa” [that being—in any way—that 
matters anyway]; Agamben, 1990, p. 9) of one’s own sense of identity 
and community? Or, even more radically, could such a transformation 
emerge by allowing for difference out of a recognition of one’s own 
inability to understand, much less translate, those expressions from 
non-Western languages that inevitably must accompany (and probably, 
will at least partially displace) many of the linguistic and philosophical 
traditions through which thinking and ethics itself have traditionally 
been possible in the West?  
 
One may question whether this imaginary crossing between 
various identities, whether actual oppressed subjects or others perhaps 
                                                 
TP
4
PT We were aware of being the other face of modernity. In effect, modernity is 
actually born in 1492 with the centrality of Europe (Eurocentrism originates 
when Europe is able to envelop the Arab World, which had been the center of 
the known world until the 15PthP century). The “I” which begins as the “I 
conquer” of Cortés or Pizarro, which precede the ego cogito by nearly a 
century, would produce genocide, the enslavement of Africans, and the colonial 
wars in Asia. The majority of present-day humanity (the South), is the other 
face of modernity. (My translation)  
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still only vaguely understood yet already given a place in his own 
imagination, truly allows for a multiplicity of positions both within and 
beyond the monolithic models of ‘human’ subjectivity. This fantasy of 
the foreigner within, whether as elaborated by Borges, politicized and 
critiqued by Dussel or even as revisited by contemporary 
poststructuralist theorists—“l’étranger nous habite; il est la face cachée 
de notre identité” (Kristeva, 1988, p. 9)—could indeed be considered 
an appropriation of the other, but this other found in ourselves is 
arguably less negating than the all-too-common alternatives of 
marginalization, absorption or outright extermination which have 
marred the history of cultural contact in the transatlantic encounter and 
beyond.TP PT 
 
But does this radical repositing of identity suggest something 
more? While it is necessary to recognize the ways in which personal 
experience determined by class origins, ethnicity and gender can shape 
one’s ability to identify and speak about how social injustice, 
hegemony and inequality is articulated in the ideologies of state, 
society and culture, these are by no means the only ways in which such 
discourses of identity and alterity are authenticated and legitimized. 
The injustices that result from the arbitrary exercise of power are at 
times too subtle to be reduced to a set of readily identifiable categorical 
reasons (language, ethnicity, class, gender, etc.). 
 
What, then, is the relevance of this philosophical discussion on 
ethics to our work as translators, interpreters and scholars in translation 
and interpretation studies? This question is actually one of the main 
reasons why the preoccupation with the fictional turn in translation 
studies continues, as these studies point toward the way representations 
of translators and interpreters in literature and both intellectual and 
popular culture has had an enormous power to shape public perceptions 
or misconceptions regarding the necessity and value of work in 
translation and interpretation. The awareness of the popular 
conceptions or misconceptions regarding who we are and what we do 
as translators and interpreters may also be considered a part of that 
relationship of ethical responsibility for the Other. 
 
Translational Fictions: Ethical Frictions?  
 
The challenge, nonetheless, is to examine the nature of our own 
translational cross-identifications in the context of a responsibility 
for/to the Other. Are translators and interpreters willing to allow a 
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largely depoliticized discussion of localization, linguistic accuracy and 
equivalence to stand in for a more broad-based discussion of 
translational ethics? And how would established humanistic sectors of 
the discipline contribute to such a discussion?  
 
On a more ‘site-specific’ level, another set of such ‘fictions of 
translation’ can be found in the 1997 novel by Pablo De Santis entitled, 
aptly enough, La traducción, and which may suggest any number of 
discussions on the ways that discursive heterogeneity and alterity are 
negotiated in our profession. It deals with a conference of translators 
held at a virtually deserted coastal resort in southern ArgentinaTPF5FPT with 
the enigmatic name of Puerto Esfinge, lit. ‘Port Sphinx.’ The partly 
abandoned, partly still unbuilt hotel stands as yet another incomplete 
Latin American project of modernization, and is peopled with 
translators of one sort or another. It recounts their failed attempts at 
understanding one another, whether through tormented love triangles or 
violent academic disputes, which once again reveal the act of 
translation within the framework of its most revisited of metaphors, the 
relationship of love and the mystery before death, a struggle between 
languages and landscapes, and with one’s own often multiple identities 
and those of others, whether past or present, fictional or all of the 
above. In this translation of self and culture, especially in these 
geographical extremes where all forms of human language may seem 
foreign, the translators’ relationship with their profession becomes all 
the more agonizing, intensified by the fact that for many of these 
characters, translation is not even a vocation, but rather a detour from 
other deferred literary or academic aspirations, “un desvío” (De Santis, 
2000, p. 12). 
 
These absurd characters at the ‘end of the world’ employ a 
wide range of methodologies to arrive at their investigative 
conclusions, all the while insisting on the infallibility of their scientific, 
                                                 
TP
5
PT It could be also stated here that this region of Argentina is the site of one of 
the country’s most brutal final campaigns against native peoples, known 
historically as the Conquest of the Desert (April 1879). It is a detail never 
mentioned here explicitly, but one that De Santis nonetheless evokes through 
his description of the landscape, whose desolation is interrupted only by 
abandoned buildings, cemeteries, the sea and an all-pervasive silence. It is this 
very silence that most often accompanies unpunished acts of murder, regardless 
of scale, and it is this kind of ‘dead silence’ upon which much of the 
construction and perpetuation of a Europeanized Latin American culture 
ultimately hinges. 
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psychological, linguistic, literary or even paranormal methodologies: 
one example is Valner, who specializes in the relationship between 
translation, UFO’s, and obscure prophetic texts. Others concern 
themselves with clinical cases of brain damage or psychological 
disturbance. For example, the main character, Miguel De Blast, is 
studying a fictional psychoanalyst named Kabliz and his patient, a 
simultaneous interpreter who, after losing the thread during an 
important international conference, cannot stop interpreting: “una 
máquina de traducir descontrolada” (an out-of-control translation 
machine, De Santis, p. 39). Another character, Doctor Blanes, brings a 
patient with him, one who, after being hit with a bullet during a 
political demonstration, ‘suffers from’ the delusion that he can 
understand and translate absolutely everything, and in any language. 
Blanes must thus deflect the inevitable criticism that he is turning his 
scientific research into a spectacle: “¿Cree que mis conferencias son un 
espectáculo de feria porque traigo a un paciente? Es fácil hablar de los 
ausentes, describir tratamientos exitosos aplicados a enfermos 
encerrados a mil kilometros de distancia. El noventa por ciento de la 
historias clínicas que conozco son ciencia ficción. Psiquiatría 
ficción.”TPF6FPT (De Santis, p. 103) This reference to science fiction (and 
other scientistic fictions) not only underscores the role of fiction in 
scientific inquiry, but also returns the discussion of the limits of 
disciplinarity in translation studies to the realm of the literary. This 
novel, as yet another Argentine fiction of translation, thus inadvertently 
becomes a parody of the territorial disputes “on the name and nature of 
translation studies” which mark the continual emergence and 
development of a discipline still by no means one.  
 
                                                 
TP
6
PT “Do you think that my lectures are a freak show because I bring my patients? 
It’s easy to talk about those not present, to describe successful treatments of the 
ill, locked up a thousand kilometers away. Ninety percent of the clinical 
histories I know of are science fiction. Psychiatry fiction.” (My translation) 
Through these psychological fictions of translation, I am reminded of Andrew 
Benjamin’s book Translation and the Nature of Philosophy and his discussion 
of the relationship between the act of translation and Freudian case studies, 
highlighting the role of unconscious and conscious memory, as well as the 
literal and figurative connotations of language in the act of psychoanalysis that 
ensures room for a new conception of “pragmatic” interpretive divergence, in 
which “the original becomes inseparable from its translation. It is of course an 
inseparability that must be understood in terms of non-equivalence” (Benjamin, 
1989, pp. 146-148).  
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Among the most disconcerting caricatures in the novel is that 
of the academic superstar Silvio Naum, who has returned to Argentina 
from Paris—the culminating scene of any ironicized Argentine 
academic or literary success story—not only to present the keynote 
address, but also to carry out a bizarre suicide pact with a number of the 
other distinguished conference participants. As we shall see, his 
opening remarks are telling, more in their capacity to obscure his own 
criminal intentions than to expose any theory of translation (that is, if 
criminal intention does not in fact also propose its own theory of 
translation): 
 
Habló de tribus perdidas en la selvas de las enciclopedias, que 
pensaban que había que hablar poco, porque las palabras gastaban el 
mundo. Habló de los que volvieron mudos de la Guerra, hombres de 
distintas naciones, que habían decidido lo mismo, como si se tratara 
de una conspiración, no decir nada, no admitir que lo que habían 
vivido podia ser contado. Habló del oído humano, que no soporta el 
silencio, y que cuando no tiene nada para alimentarse, comienza a 
generar su propio zumbido. Habló de ciertos chamanes que pasan 
años sin hablar, hasta que encuentran un día la palabra verdadera, que 
nadie entiende. Habló de los que morían con un secreto. 
El verdadero problema para un traductor —dijo al final— no es la 
distancia entre los idiomas o los mundos, no es la jerga ni la 
indefinición ni la música; el verdadero problema es el silencio de una 
lengua —y no me molestaré en atacar a los imbeciles que creen que 
un texto es más valioso cuanto más frágil y menos traducible, a los 
que creen que los libros son objetos de cristal—, porque todo lo 
demás puede ser traducido, pero no el modo en que una obra calla; de 
eso —dijo— no hay traducción possible.TPF7FPT (De Santis, 2000, p. 90) 
                                                 
TP
7
PT He spoke of lost jungle tribes found only in encyclopedias who believed that 
one should not speak too much, that in speaking the world wears out, and of 
those who came home from war mute, men from different countries who all 
came to the same conclusion, as if it were some kind of conspiracy, not 
speaking, unwilling to admit that what one had experienced could be told. He 
spoke of human hearing and how it can’t stand silence, and how, when it has 
nothing on which to feed, it begins to generate its own buzzing sound. He 
spoke of certain shamans who spent years without uttering a single word, until 
they found the one true word that no one understands. He spoke of those who 
die with a secret. 
At the end, he said: “The real problem for a translator is not the distance which 
exists between languages or worlds, nor specialized vocabulary nor vagueness 
nor music; the real problem is that of a language’s silence—and I won’t bother 
to attack the imbeciles who believe that a text is the more valuable when the 
more fragile and less translatable, who believe that books are made of glass— 
 36
 
In short, De Santis presents us with yet another Argentine Tower of 
Babel, one in which translators and scholars refuse to communicate 
with and understand each other even when they are speaking the same 
language, that is, when not insisting that they understand each other 
when they in fact do not. The disconcerting possibility that we as 
specialists in cross-cultural communication cannot understand each 
other, however, pales in comparison to De Santis’ suggestion that we 
simply refuse to do so. However comfortable we may be with our own 
silences, they are made all the more audible against this backdrop of 
other silences: tribal knowledge, the trauma of genocide (whether as 
victim, perpetrator or ‘innocent bystander’), or the innumerable 
moments of commonplace, yet no less unbearable, solitude. If this is 
the case, then Levinas’ call for ethical responsibility is more urgent 
than ever, especially if we are to achieve a working dialogue among the 
divergent linguistic, cultural and ideological groupings in our discipline 
and beyond. 
 
At this point, one must relinquish any illusions of a single 
theory capable of adequately accommodating the phenomenon of 
translation and multilingualism in a rapidly globalizing cultural 
environment, a reality shaped not only by erudite specialists who 
negotiate the continual encounter between pairs of Western European 
languages, but one also explored by anthropologists and no less by the 
communities they study, whose acts of translation and interpretation 
reveal an entirely different set of encounters with ‘metropolitan’ 
culture. It thus comes as no surprise that in his contribution to his 
collection of essays on translation and ethnography, the Brazilian 
anthropologist Tullio Maranhão has recognized the relevance of 
Levinas to his own work in interpreting the cultures of Amazonian 
Indians, not as yet another Western theory to be applied or European 
counterpoint to the inherent threat under which many of these 
populations attempt to plot out their own survival. What ethnography 
teaches us about translation may be something quite different, and will 
in all probability not be what we were expecting. It may not reward our 
institutionalized standards of competence, nor privilege our traditional 
modes of organizing knowledge in language; as he notes in his 
introduction, “ethnographic mistranslation has deep roots in the 
political history of the nation-state introduced in Western Europe and 
                                                                                                 
because everything else can be translated, but not the ways in which a text 
remains silent; for this there is no possible translation.” (my translation) 
 37
the Americas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the 
economic and political correlate of society” (Maranhão, 2003, pp. xix-
xx). Thus, in this reconfiguration of the study of translation under the 
sign of ethics, if it is indeed to the Other to whom our ethical 
responsibility as translators must be addressed, it may not only be 
through the exactitude of our translations, but in a critical revision of 
our very understanding of translation itself and the cultural 
preconceptions on which it is predicated.  
 
On the Ethics of Futurity in Translation Studies 
 
The question of future, whether expressed as a utopian philosophical 
consideration or a concrete set of institutional goals, is one that has 
been intimately linked to the act of translation at the most basic level, 
as the original text must invariably await in the form of a future 
translation, one that is by no means guaranteed. In this sense, 
translators are artists of futurity, as much as translation studies scholars 
are theorists of futures, in both their past and present conceptions: who, 
in posing the questions of futurity, are also engaged in the most 
ethically committed of philosophical discussions. It is these critical 
interventions which make a renewed conception of future possible, 
whether in ‘our own’ languages and cultures or in those of others.  
 
I would suggest, moreover, that it is this relationship between 
translation and future that has encouraged so many diverse visions of 
the discipline over the last thirty to thirty-five years in the course of the 
foundation and development of Translation Studies. One might even go 
so far as to state that translation studies, in its recurrent use of maps, 
disciplinary visions and even utopian proposals to plot its future, has 
already provided enough material for us to write at least a preliminary 
history of it. Through the examination of the discipline’s own future 
visions, one will discover that the future that translation studies has 
been creating for itself cannot be imagined as singular, but is 
irrevocably pluralistic at this stage in its development. Diversity of 
approach is perhaps the identifying mark of contemporary translation 
studies. Since the formative period in which James Holmes was writing 
about the name and nature of translation studies and mapping out 
possible futures for it, a constant characteristic of translation studies has 
been the lack of a common language (Holmes, 1988, p. 70).  
 
Through this point of view, one informed by both Levinas and 
contemporary Latin American thought and by which theories of 
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translation are by nature theories of radical cultural alterity, it becomes 
all the more impossible to ignore the ethical considerations regarding 
the relationship with the Other as Identity in Exteriority in relation to 
the acts of translation and interpreting. For this reason, global debates 
in ethical philosophy should continue to inform studies of ethics in 
translation, and perhaps even more so in the growing area of 
community interpreting, especially given the crucial relationship 
between translation and the political struggle for human rights. By the 
same token, it is by no means the only disciplinary dialogue that this 
question calls forth; continuing work in anthropology, sociology, ethnic 
studies and other social science disciplines will no doubt continue to 
challenge the largely Western confines in which much of the 
discussions of translation studies and its methodologically divergent 
futures have been situated.  
 
In this far from final analysis, it should come as no surprise 
that this vision of the future will no doubt continue to negotiate with at 
least a measure of ambivalence, if not hopelessness. At the end of his 
book, Translation and Taboo, Doug Robinson expresses his own 
ambivalence for the future of translation studies. He writes, “As I move 
toward an ending I am finding it hard, surprisingly hard for a utopian 
romantic thinker like myself, to summon the energy needed to radiate 
hope” (Robinson, 1996, p. 215). According to Robinson, there are still 
too many taboos in Translation Studies for it to have any kind of 
assured future, too many prohibitions set in place by our own sense of 
the legitimate discursive limits of translation and its discipline, if not a 
lingering rigidity in personal and professional conviction that at times 
makes any significant dialogue impossible.  
 
Robinson is far from being the only disillusioned utopian 
among established Translation Studies scholars. One only need return 
to Lawrence Venuti’s book The Translator’s Invisibility to recognize 
that there appears to be an ongoing crisis in translation studies, one 
perpetuated by the often hostile institutional environment in which 
many translators are still forced to operate:  
  
The translator’s invisibility today raises such troubling questions 
about the geopolitical economy of culture that a greater suspicion is 
urgently needed to confront them. Yet the suspicion I am 
encouraging here assumes a utopian faith in the power of translation 
to make a difference, not only at home, in the emergence of new 
cultural forms, but also abroad, in the emergence of new cultural 
relations. To recognize the translator’s invisibility is at once to 
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critique the current situation and to hope for a future more hospitable 
to the differences that the translator must negotiate. (Venuti, 1995, 
p. 313)  
 
There may be ways that this hopelessness can be mitigated, perhaps 
precisely in the recognition of our discipline’s social value beyond the 
confines of academe. Contrary to Venuti and Robinson’s conjectures, 
however, a commitment to futurity need not be utopian, and may not 
even be contingent upon “faith” or “hope,” at least not in any 
traditional sense. As Levinas reaffirms, another ethics is possible, one 
based not only on emotions or illusions but also on a measure of “dés-
inter-essement.” This emphasis on the role of disinterested commitment 
by no means precludes the role that feelings and beliefs may play in the 
continued commitment to projects of futurity, but more importantly, 
ensures a continued commitment to those projects at the inevitable 
moments when our sense of expectation does not in itself suffice.  
 
After all, as historical experience in Latin American cultures 
underscores, social change is often precipitated by cultural agents who 
demand and succeed in the transformation of their societies precisely 
because they act out of intolerable—often dictatorial, but also 
genocidal—spaces in which a significant amount of, if not all, hope and 
faith have already been exhausted. As the Chilean critic and social 
researcher Martín Hopenhayn reminds us in his discussion of the 
possibilities of Utopian thought today:  
 
Between literature, landscape, culture, the partial rationalization of 
life, utopia can and must be produced. Utopia in order to reread crisis 
and split it open. Utopia, in order to stock with meaning what 
administrative rationality (imposed in the adjustment, in 
Mephistophelian deals regarding external credits, in the worthless 
composure of the utterly hopeless) has previously despoiled. Utopia 
that would not necessarily be universal, rational, western. […] Utopia 
that mixes, that hybridizes, that combines and recombines anew the 
scarcity of the present in order to suggest the plentitude of the future. 
Utopia that is both a factual impossibility and a cultural necessity, a 
political challenge and threat, dreams to trick both integration and the 
apocalypse. (Hopenhayn, 2001, p. 153)  
 
Viewed from this critical context, translation remains, in spite of its 
history of institutional subordinations and inequality, a particularly 
privileged form of “being-in-the-world” when viewed from a broader 
sociopolitical perspective, composed as it is of subjects who, in spite of 
their other professional responsibilities and institutional vicissitudes, 
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use their own multilingual abilities to expand, transform and 
complicate the cultural environment in which they operate. By giving a 
virtually exclusive importance to either statistical corpus-based or 
purely literary research, translation studies runs the risk of limiting 
itself to elite academic environments, thus diminishing the socially 
transformative potential of its work in the very cultural and linguistic 
margins that we as scholars often claim to represent.  
 
As academics and/or intellectuals, we can no longer claim to 
speak from a space of relative security, no more than we can delude 
ourselves about the instrumental role that translation already has in the 
operations of major global conflicts. In the 21PstP century, we as 
translation scholars must recognize and explore critically the ways that 
the acts of translation and interpreting are continually enlisted before 
this widening expanse of linguistic and cultural complexity. In light of 
these historical and institutional changes, it is perhaps more important 
than ever to recognize how translation is not simply our object of study, 
but also an essential intellectual and cultural tool that can allow the 
translator a measure of critical distance and selectivity in relation to 
current discourses, policies and priorities, thus shaping a new set of 
future ethical imperatives with relation to language, culture and society.  
 
In the end, the field of translation studies remains an ongoing 
investigation, not only into linguistic diversity, but also into the cultural 
and discursive heterogeneity of our societies and institutions. After all, 
it is not only through linguistic competence or academic rigor that we 
as a community of specialists determine our future, but also in our 
ability to understand as well as dialogue with those who articulate their 
academic concerns in ways different from our own, and allow 
discursive and institutional space for those yet to arrive. Such 
considerations are not merely disciplinary, but have come to bear far 
more extensive social and human repercussions, and thus deserve a 
place in any vision of our shared future.  
 
University of Connecticut 
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ABSTRACT: Levinas, Latin American Thought and the Futures of 
Translational Ethics  This article underscores the relevance of the 
ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas to contemporary discussions 
of translational ethics, especially with respect to contemplations of the 
discipline’s future. It posits thinking of the future as an ethical 
imperative against the historical backdrop of the Holocaust and other 
human ethical crises. Despite the foreclosure of utopian thinking that 
such a context might imply, there are nonetheless other modes of 
imagining translation in other terms, whether “dés-inter-essement,” 
cross-identification, or other forms of transcultural ethical 
consciousness. The discussion is highlighted by examples from Latin 
American literature, liberation philosophy and anthropology, as well as 
from the historical trajectory of the discipline of translation studies 
from the 1970’s to the present. 
 
RÉSUMÉ: Lévinas, pensée latino-américaine et avenirs possibles 
pour une éthique traductrice  Le présent article souligne la 
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pertinence de la philosophie éthique d’Emmanuel Lévinas dans les 
débats actuels sur l’éthique dans la traduction, et en particulier à propos 
des considérations sur l’avenir de cette discipline. Avec l’Holocauste, 
ou d’autres crises éthiques humaines pour toile de fond, cet article 
postule une réflexion sur l’avenir comme impératif éthique. Bien qu’un 
tel contexte semble exclure la possibilité de toute pensée utopique, il 
existe néanmoins d’autres modes de concevoir la traduction, que ce soit 
par le « dés-intér-essement », la transidentification ou d’autres formes 
de conscience éthique transculturelle. Nous étayerons notre discussion 
par des exemples tirés de la littérature latino-américaine, de la 
philosophie de la libération, de l’anthropologie, ou encore pris dans la 
trajectoire historique de la discipline de la traductologie depuis les 
années soixante-dix. 
 
Key words: Levinas, ethics, transcultural consciousness, cross-
identification. 
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